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SUMMARYAs economic growth resumes, a timely exit from the current
crisis mode of unsustainable budgetary, monetary and financial sector
policies is needed. Yet, the exit must not be rushed or we risk a relapse into
another recession. We propose a sequence of steps towards the exit which
should be closely coordinated at European and, where possible, global level
over the coming months. Furthermore, in order to ensure that this exit
strategy is credible and does not prove to be an empty promise of consoli-
dation, we suggest institutional arrangements within the EU that would
provide incentives to follow through.
POLICY CHALLENGE
First, the identification and recapitalisation of ailing banks must be com-
pleted urgently, with a clear timetable for the phasing-out of state support.
Second, member states should adopt medium-term sustainability bud-
getary plans in summer 2010 to be implemented from 2011. These plans
should detail annual minimum and maximum consolidation objectives as
well as a debt target for 2014. Third, monetary policy should remain as sup-
portive as possible. Fourth, given continuing low interest rates, and in order
to supervise phasing-in of
more stringent financial reg-
ulation, the planned
European Systemic Risk
Board should become opera-
tional as early as summer
2010. Finally, to ensure the
necessary coordination of
the exit between member
states and central banks, an
ad-hoc reinforced consulta-
tion mechanism should be
set up at European level for
2.5 years, renewable once.
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Figure 1: Surging deficits in response to the crisis
Cumulative budget deficits 2008-2010 as a percentage of GDP in 2010
Source: IMF (2009b),for Poland: IMF Article IV Report, August 2009.
1. This Policy Brief sum-
marises and updates a
paper prepared at the
request of the Swedish
EU Council presidency
for the ECOFIN Council
of 1 October 2009.
Research assistance by
Martin Kessler is grate-
fully acknowledged.
2. See for example
Cerra and Saxena,
2008, Pisani-Ferry and
van Pottelsberghe,
2009, and IMF, 2009b.
an increase in the structural
budgetary deficit. 
Monetary policy has brought
interest rates down to nearly zero
for all major currencies, including
the euro. In addition, central-bank
efforts to rescue financial systems
by giving banks easier access to
central-bank money has caused a
rapid and signicant expansion,
and changes in the composition, of
their balance sheets.   So far, this
policy of ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualita-
tive easing’ has not affected the
broad money supply and therefore
not resulted in inflationary pres-
sures (von Hagen, 2009). But as
banking systems recover central
banks must keep a keen eye on
monetary developments to ensure
that inflationary potential does
not build up in the future.
Governments have also supported
directly banking systems through
guarantee schemes and recapitali-
sation. These measures have suc-
ceeded in restoring some financial
stability. However, the most recent
estimates of the necessary write-
downs in the banking sector
(Figure 2) raise the question of if
recapitalisation to date has been
sufficient. Available evidence (IMF,
2009c) suggests there are signifi-
cant differences across countries
and across banks, which suggests
targeted action at national level is
still required.  
So far, European governments
have focused on emergency meas-
ures to prevent collapse of the
financial system without fully
addressing the fundamental issue
of undercapitalisation of the
banks. Meanwhile banks are bor-
rowing at near-zero interest rates
and investing in higher-yielding
ence of exit policy instruments
and what this implies. The fourth
section develops a sequenced exit
strategy and discusses its imple-
mentation. The fifth section sum-
marises the policy recommenda-
tions.
THE POST-CRISIS LANDSCAPE 
One year after the acute crisis
started in Europe, monetary and
fiscal policy are operating in crisis
mode. The resulting surge in bud-
get deficits (Figure 1) is unprece-
dented in the EU. As a conse-
quence, the IMF (2009a) projects
an increase in the average debt-to-
GDP ratio in the euro area of 30
percentage points, to reach 90
percent of GDP by 2014. The aver-
age disguises substantial increas-
es for some member states. 
Part of the budgetary deterioration
is cyclical, but part is permanent.
In the years following a shock,
growth rates often recover to the
pre-crisis pace but the loss in out-
put level typically remains perma-
nent
2, implying a corresponding
lasting shortfall in government
revenues. As a result, there will be
THE CURRENT BUDGETARY, mone-
tary, and financial-sector policies
have been emergency measures
to cushion the initial blow of the
crisis and to prepare the road to
recovery. But these emergency
measures are not sustainable in
the long run and must be phased
out. Finding the right exit strategy
is difficult. How fast can and
should normalisation take place?
How should budgetary, monetary
and financial-sector policies be
sequenced? And should these
steps be coordinated within the
euro area, the EU and beyond in
order to avoid adverse macroeco-
nomic developments? To compli-
cate matters further, the task is
not only to return to the normal
state of the economy before the
crisis.  As a result of the crisis and
of the lessons to be learned from it,
'normality' in the future will have
to be different from pre-crisis
‘business as usual’.
This policy brief addresses these
questions and outlines an exit
strategy for the EU
1. The second
section looks at the conditions
currently confronting us. The third
section explores the interdepend-A EUROPEAN EXIT STRATEGY
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3. The output gap is the
difference between
potential output and
actual output.
United States Euro area Rest of western Europe
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Figure 2: Reported and estimated potential write-downs in the bank
sector(in percent of GDP)
Source: IMF (2009c). Note: rest of Western Europe includes Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK.
assets, which is allowing them to
regain better profitability and to
strengthen their capital base. This
process could go on for as long as
it takes for them to reach the
capital ratios required by
regulatory and, perhaps more
importantly, market standards.
However, in the meantime it
involves the risk of relapse into
instability in the banking sector
and persistent constraints on the
supply of credit. In view of this, it
would be unwise to undertake the
necessary fiscal and monetary
policy exit without first addressing
the remaining problems of the
financial sector.
POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND
STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE
An appropriate exit strategy must
have at least three broad
objectives: 
iT h e   restoration of budgetary
sustainability, 
ii Macroeconomic stability with
non-inflationary growth at a
pace compatible with elimina-
tion of the ‘output gap’
3 in the
medium term, and 
iii Financial stability, which
implies both stability of the
Note: macro-prudential oversight is categorised here as belonging to central banking because it is
assumed that, following European Council decisions in June, it will largely be done by central banks.
Table 1:
Dimensions of exit from exceptional crisis management measures 
Institutional actor
Governments Central banks
Impact
on
Macro Budgetary consolidation
Monetary tightening (reverse
quantitative easing, increase
interest rates from near-zero level)
Banks
Withdrawal of government
guarantees for banks;
Bank triage, recapitalisation and
restructuring
Withdrawal of liquidity support
for banking sector;
Macroprudential oversight
Table 2:
Direct and indirect impact of exit policies on exit and other major objectives
(Direct impact in red) Impact on exit objectives
Budgetary
sustainability
Macro
stability
Financial
stability
Potential
output
Exit
policies
Budgetary consolidation + - +/-
Monetary tightening - -/+ +/-
Withdrawal of liquidity
support
+ - - -
Withdrawal of government
guarantees
+ - - -
Other
policies
Bank recapitalisation and
restructuring -/+ + +
Macroprudential oversight + + 0
financial sector without govern-
ment or central-bank support
and the prevention of financial
instability in the future. 
The pursuit of these exit objectives
involves budgetary consolidation,
monetary tightening and the with-
drawal of guarantees and excep-
tional liquidity support for banks.
Table 1 shows the various policy
instruments involved in the subse-
quent exit discussion. 
However, each of these policy
actions has both direct and indi-
rect effects that should be taken
into account when designing an
exit strategy. Table 2 provides a
stylised summary of the likely
direct and indirect impact of exitb
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policies on the exit and other major
policy objectives.
It is instructive to explore these
effects in detail, starting with the
impact of budgetary consolidation.
While its direct impact on
budgetary sustainability will nor-
mally be positive, budgetary con-
solidation would tend to reduce
economic activity, especially
where consolidation relies on
increasing tax rates. Such a reduc-
tion in economic activity would
tend to reduce inflation and nega-
tively affect the health of the
financial sector, not least because
of increased default risks. Finally,
the impact on potential output
depends on the quality of the
adjustment programme, so it is
ambiguous.
The impact of monetary tightening
is similar to the impact of bud-
getary consolidation, so to some
extent they can be thought of as
substitutes. But there are two
important differences. First, while
the impact of budgetary consolida-
tion on price stability tends to be
positive, the indirect impact of
monetary tightening on debt sus-
tainability tends to be negative,
both on account of an increased
output gap and higher real interest
rates on legacy debt. Furthermore,
the impact on financial-sector
stability of monetary tightening is
ambiguous. While monetary tight-
ening tends to reduce financial-
sector profitability, thereby
increasing the vulnerability of ail-
ing banks, real interest rates close
to or even below zero increase the
likelihood of disruptive bubbles in
asset prices. By reducing the risk
of the re-emergence of bubbles, in-
creased interest rates therefore
also improve financial stability.  
The withdrawal of liquidity support
from the banking sector reduces
the budgetary and quasi-
budgetary exposure to banking
risks, thereby helping to improve
budgetary sustainability. However,
the positive budgetary impact
might be inhibited if this very with-
drawal increases the risk of
financial-sector instability. 
So: all core exit policies could
therefore negatively impact not
only economic activity but also
financial-sector stability. This
implies a strategic interdepend-
ence between these instruments,
meaning: simultaneous and vigor-
ous pursuit of all three exit policies
might entail a serious risk of a dou-
ble-dip recession and a renewed
crisis in the banking sector. 
Fortunately, the risk linked to this
strategic interdependence can be
mitigated somewhat by the pur-
suit of complementary policies
(‘other policies’ in Table 2). Bank
recapitalisation and restructuring,
and macroprudential oversight,
are additional instruments for
reaching the policy objectives.
DESIGNING AN EXIT STRATEGY
The European Council of 18-19
June concluded that ‘there is a
clear need for a reliable and credi-
ble exit strategy, inter alia by
improving the medium-term fiscal
framework and through coordinat-
ed medium-term economic
policies.’ 
A prerequisite:
complete the recapitalisation and
restructuring of ailing banks
Identification, recapitalisation and
restructuring of ailing banks, not
fiscal retrenchment, should be the
first step in the exit strategy. Once
accomplished in full, it will allow
central banks and ministers of
finance to pursue their future
monetary and budgetary exits
without the constant fear of caus-
ing renewed bank failures in the
process. Furthermore, attending to
banks first will boost recovery by
making credit more readily avail-
able to business and enhancing
longer-term growth prospects at
the same time.
International interdependence is
at work here, especially within the
euro area: in countries where big
banks remain insecure and de-
pendent on exceptional liquidity
provision at near-zero interest
rates, lack of action by treasuries
represents a de-facto constraint
on the ECB’s freedom of action.     
But the recommended swift bank
recapitalisation is easier said than
done. The main difficulty is that it
is hard to make the case to elec-
torates angry at the financial
sector. It should be argued force-
fully that delaying recapitalisation
is likely to be even more costly, as
the example of Japan illustrates.
Also, it should be pointed out that
recapitalisation can even be a
profitable investment, as was the
case in Sweden. In addition, proper
incentives for member states not
to delay recapitalisation should be
provided. First, credible deadlines
should be set regarding the phas-
ing out of government guarantees
at the European level, using EU
state-aid rules to enforce it.
Second, central banks may wish to
design their exit from bank sup-
port measures along a similar
timescale. This is possible since
there are no compelling reasons toA EUROPEAN EXIT STRATEGY
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4. The stress-test
results made public by
the CEBS on 1 October
2009 include almost no
information on the dif-
fering situations across
countries and across
banks. They therefore
fail to provide sufficient
guidance. 
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Figure 3: Projected debt to GDP ratio in 2020 assuming annual consolida-
tion of 0.5% GDP*
* As a function of one-time loss in potential output due to the crisis. Source: Bruegel simulations, see
Box 1 (overleaf).
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Figure 4: Consolidation rate required to reach a 75 percent debt-to-GDP
ratio in 2020*
* As a function of one-time loss in potential output due to the crisis. Source: Bruegel simulations, see
Box 1 (overleaf).
link the timing to that of the other
aspects of the monetary exit,
especially macroeconomic nor-
malisation (see for example Bini
Smaghi (2009), Trichet (2009)
and Bernanke (2009)). Third, the
requirements of the excessive-
deficit procedure should be adapt-
ed to accommodate bank recapi-
talisation. This could be achieved
by temporarily calculating the
budgetary cost of bank rescue net
of the value of the bank shares
governments receive in return.
Once that arrangement expires, for
example in 2014, the return to the
usual Maastricht definition of the
debt would serve as a welcome
incentive not to unduly delay pri-
vatisation. Lastly, comprehensive
stress-testing and a framework for
work-out at the European level
would be highly desirable (see
Posen and Véron 2009 for a
detailed proposal)
4.
The first macro step: budgetary
consolidation
Budgetary consolidation should
come before monetary tightening,
mainly because fiscal policy is the
more costly and less nimble stim-
ulus instrument. Besides, delaying
consolidation or leaving its pace
and duration hanging in the air
would involve a non-trivial risk of
adverse bond-market reaction.
Finally, successful budgetary con-
solidation will reduce inflationary
pressures, thereby allowing cen-
tral banks to sustain a supportive
monetary policy stance for longer
and tighten monetary policy only
when inflationary potential arises.
This sequencing, rather than mon-
etary tightening first and
budgetary consolidation second,
should be a priority goal in the
design of exit strategies.  
least because of the rapidly
increasing budgetary cost of age-
ing populations. 
By way of illustration, Figure 4
shows that the annual consolida-
tion speed might have to be  sig-
nificantly above the minimum rate
of the SGP if the objective were to
achieve a debt-to- GDP ratio of 75
percent on average across the EU.
(The challenge of consolidation
will be greater still for a number of
individual EU countries inside and
outside the euro area). 
Figure 3 shows the extent to which
the budgetary outlook has wors-
ened during the crisis. According to
our simple fiscal simulation, the
debt-to-GDP ratio for the EU27
could still stand at 100 percent of
GDP in 2020, even assuming a full
withdrawal of the stimulus pack-
ages in 2011 and a budgetary con-
solidation rate of 0.5 percent of
GDP per annum thereafter, which is
the minimum consolidation speed
required by the EU’s Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP). This debt level
could be unacceptably high, notA EUROPEAN EXIT STRATEGY
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5. This is also the con-
clusion of Cottarelli and
Viñals (2009).
6. These conditions
included inter alia
strong external
demand, initially high
levels of long-term
interest rates (which
dropped as a conse-
quence of consolida-
tion), and monetary
support (lower interest-
rate and exchange-rate
depreciation in
response to 
consolidation).
7. In this process of
normalisation, central
banks should continue
their past practice of
focusing on second-
round effects of
increases in world
market prices of raw
materials and agricul-
tural produce if and
when they arise as the
global economy starts
to pick up again.
BOX 2: KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF THE FISCAL SIMULATION
The fiscal simulation underlying Figures 3 and 4 uses the most recent
data and forecast of the European Commission’s DG ECFIN for the EU27
as a starting point. It then assumes a 1.5 percent growth rate of
potential output until 2020, a linear narrowing of the output gap until it
reaches zero in 2015, and a real interest rate for public borrowing of 2.5
percent. 
On that basis, the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio is extrapolated
until 2020 as a function of two key parameters: the one-time loss in
potential output due to the crisis and the speed of budgetary consoli-
dation. Specifically, a one-time hit to potential output in 2010 varying
between 0 percent and 5 percent of potential GDP is considered. The
consolidation is modelled assuming that discretionary stimuli are sus-
tained in 2010, fully discontinued in 2011 and as of 2012 varying
speeds of consolidation are applied. For example, at a consolidation
speed of 0.5 percent of GDP, the primary budgetary position is
improved by an additional half percent of GDP every year until the
budgetary surplus reaches 1 percent of GDP. After that, the structural
expenditure and revenue ratios are kept constant.
that should be adopted by national
parliaments by summer 2010.
Reforms that improve public-
finance sustainability in the medi-
um run, notably pension reforms,
should be taken into account in the
setting of budgetary objectives.
With these comprehensive prog-
rammes, member states should
commit to a minimum speed of
consolidation and to debt ratio sta-
bilisation by 2014 at the latest. 
While budgetary consolidation
must be swift, it should not be
abrupt. The multiple impact of sig-
nificant and simultaneous re-
trenchment in most EU countries
(and beyond) is likely to represent
an important drag on demand
growth. The conditions that in the
past allowed some countries to
experience painless consolidation
are unlikely to be met
6. Thus, the
proposed national Sustainability
Programmes should not only pro-
vide a minimum but also a maxi-
mum envisaged speed of consoli-
From these simulations we can
conclude that the budgetary con-
solidation required will be sub-
stantial on average
5. In order to
make this politically delicate and
painful process credible and suc-
cessful, a strong collective com-
mitment is needed at European
level over and above the provi-
sions of the SGP. Although the Pact
is not the answer to the consolida-
tion challenge, as officials tend to
claim, it should not be weakened in
the process but rather used as an
instrument to achieve
sustainability. This is by no means
trivial since we are in uncharted
territory: today, as many as 20
member states out of 27 find
themselves subject to the SGP’s
excessive-deficit procedure. 
The primary focus should be on
restoring the sustainability of pub-
lic finances. The larger the debt
ratio, the faster consolidation
should be, enforced via medium-
term Sustainability Programmes
dation, and their implementation
should be jointly monitored.
Implementation could be coordi-
nated by the Eurogroup for the
euro area whereas the EU’s ECOFIN
Council (for EU-wide coordination)
and the G20 (for global coordina-
tion) should also play their roles. 
The credibility of government com-
mitments to sustainable public
finances is the key to successful
consolidation. We recommend that
governments establish
Sustainability Councils at the
national level with the task of mon-
itoring the development of public
finances, advising governments
on strategies to reduce debt and
giving public comments on, and
assessments of, their countries’
public finances (see Pisani-Ferry
et al., 2008). Countries with more
effective institutions or effective
fiscal rules and stronger track
records should be given more flexi-
bility in implementing their com-
mitments. EU member states
should also consult on reforms
that can help offset the decline in
potential output resulting from the
crisis, and strengthen potential
output growth in the medium term.
They should start to implement
these commitments in 2010 and
they should be prioritised in the
forthcoming update of the Lisbon
strategy, the EU’s own mid-term
economy strategy template.
Monetary policy: arm’s-length
support 
If budgetary policy is given prece-
dence, the implication is that, con-
sistent with central banks’ man-
dates, monetary policy should
remain geared to price stability
and would normalise once justified
by expected price developments
7.A EUROPEAN EXIT STRATEGY
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is therefore advisable to establish
temporary arrangements for coor-
dination, with a sunset clause. We
recommend that EU governments
and central banks commit to coor-
dinating exit strategies and set up
under Article 100 (1) of the Treaty
a temporary (say two and a half
years, renewable once) reinforced
consultation mechanism. This
should commit governments to ex-
ante consultation with the Comm-
ission and partners on all aspects
of exit strategies and should
include a joint political commit-
ment to make use of country-
specific recommendations in the
case of departure from the com-
monly agreed strategy.
With such a temporary EU coordi-
nation framework in place, it will
also be easier to develop ‘coopera-
tive and coordinated exit strate-
gies’ at the global level as called
for at the Pittsburgh G20 summit
8.
G20 cooperation would need to
include discussion of exchange-
rate developments, in particular
with the US and China. 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the above analysis,
we recommend the following:
1. In recognition of the exception-
al character of the situation, EU
governments and central banks
should commit to coordinating
exit strategies and set up a
reinforced consultation mecha-
nismto this effect. 
2. Bank recapitalisation and re-
structuring should be complet-
ed in all EU countries urgently.
Until the end of 2014, assess-
ments of member states’ bud-
getary situations and budgetary
consolidation plans should be
they might consider at odds with
their independence and their
mandate. And substantively, cen-
tral banks focused on inflation
might well like rapid budgetary
consolidation more than govern-
ments with their minds on short-
term growth and employment. This
could lead to a situation where a
government go-slow on budgetary
consolidation provokes central
banks into a headlong dash for
monetary tightening. 
Against this background we rec-
ommend that, at the technical
level, efforts be intensified to form
a consensus view between mem-
ber states and central banks on
where potential output currently
stands and how it is likely to
evolve. And at the political level,
budgetary authorities will be well
advised to internalise to some
extent the often more hawkish exit
preferences of the central banks to
assure that the desired sequential
exit can take place. 
Governments and central banks
should keep each other abreast of
their intended policies and each
take into account the plans of the
other. In particular, the ECB should
be very clear about its views of the
situation and explain to govern-
ments the conditions under which
it would hold interest rates low and
the conditions under which it
would think that higher interest
rates would be more appropriate.
The coordination challenge
Economic policy coordination is
controversial in the EU. The need
for coordination at this juncture
should not be used as a pretext to
strengthen it permanently. Any
attempt to do so could backfire. It
Against the background of weak
public demand and possibly weak
global demand, this may take
some time. Hence, policy interest
rates may have to remain close to
zero for an extended period and
unconventional initiatives may for
the time being have to remain part
of central bankers’ toolkit. 
However, there is a non-negligible
danger that a low interest-rate
environment could once again fuel
bubbles and recreate the condi-
tions that contributed to the
financial excesses of the early
2000s. Already signs have
emerged pointing in this direction.
In response, a second policy
instrument for central banks is
needed in addition to the interest
rate. We recommend speeding up
the creation of the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),
which the European Council
agreed on in June. Ideally, it
should be in place by summer
2010. This strengthened macro-
prudential supervision framework
could be used inter alia to help
time the phasing in of stricter and
anti-cyclical capital buffers for
banks, and pre-empt the exces-
sive leveraging that can accompa-
ny bubbles. 
Another, politically more delicate,
concern is the coordination
required to achieve the desired
sequencing between fiscal and
monetary policy. The difficulty is
not so much that governments
and central banks would find it
hard to agree on the principle that
budgetary exit should come first
and monetary exit later once infla-
tionary pressures are building up
again. However, central banks are
reluctant formally to engage in any
form of ex-ante coordination thatb
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made on the basis of gross
government debt net of the
value of bank capital held by
the government, instead of
gross debt. Firm deadlines
should be set for the termina-
tion of government guarantees.  
3. Budgetary consolidationshould
start in 2011 with the with-
drawal of the stimulus and con-
tinue at a steady pace under a
'European Sustainability Prog-
ramme' covering 2010-2015.
In accordance with this pro-
gramme, each government
should present to its parliament
by summer 2010 a medium-
term budgetary plan, including
a debt target for end-2014, and
annual minimum and maxi-
mum consolidation objectives. 
4. The proposed European
Sustainability Programme
should be enforced through the
SGP. This may require technical
amendments to SGP pro-
cedures to accommodate the
timetable for the exit after such
a severe crisis. Governments
should also be encouraged to
strengthen their budgetary
institutions, including through
the establishment of independ-
ent Sustainability Councils. 
5. Central banks, especially the
ECB, should resist the tempta-
tion of premature tightening.
Timely budgetary retrenchment
and post-crisis adjustments in
the private sector will weaken
aggregate demand, creating
more room for monetary policy
without increasing inflationary
pressures, though central banks
should be ready to increase
interest rates to deal with
potential inflationary threats.
6. To avoid the build-up of fin-
ancial instability in the context
of exceptionally low short-term
interest rates, preparations for
the creation of the European
Systemic Risk Board, and for
the definition of a macropruden-
tial policy framework, should
speed up with a view to being
operational by summer 2010.
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